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1Summary
The United States taxes its citizens on their worldwide income. Since the
U.S. taxpayers are not always very complaisant the government has had to
create ways to disclose and control transactions and penalise non-compliant
taxpayers.
The United States has been, and is one of the world’s leading countries in
the fight against harmful tax competition, ever since it decided to implement
the Controlled Foreign Corporation legislation in 1934. This legislation
consists of different sets of legislation that work together to let the IRS tax a
shareholder on the income of a foreign company. This is done even though
the shareholder has not yet received any dividends from that company. 
Treaty shopping has been countered with a limitation on benefits clause in
every new international income tax treaty. This clause requires a company to
fulfil certain requirements to be eligible for treaty protection.      
The IRS is also very active in the area of inter-company pricing where it
allocates gross income, deductions, and credits between related taxpayers to
the extent necessary or to clearly reflect the income of related taxpayers. 
Other recent developments involve trying to create a blacklist of tax havens
and a set of regulations about disclosure. Tax shelter promoters are now
required to register confidential corporate tax shelters. Promoters also have
to maintain a list identifying each investor who has bought an interest in a
potentially abusive shelter. Corporate taxpayers who participate in a tax
shelter are also required to report their participation to the IRS. 
The new disclosure requirements have received a lot of criticism from
various directions for involving too many transactions in the reporting
requirement. The legislation is also unclear and creates uncertainty. This
will lead to excessive work for taxpayers as well as the IRS. 
An Office of Tax Shelter Analysis will be created to handle all information
about tax shelters and there will be penalties for both taxpayers and
promoters who do not follow the new disclosure regulations.
The OECD is an organisation active in the fight against harmful tax
competition. Their work involves setting criteria for identifying and listing
potentially harmful tax regimes. The criteria they use are not too different
from the ones used by the United States. The main difference between the
OECD and the United States is the focus by the OECD on countries and
their tax systems and the focus by the United States on the individual
taxpayer.  
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41 Introduction
The first federal income tax the United States levied on its citizens was
adopted in 1864.1 Since then a lot of things have happened in the field of
taxation. The tax rates have increased for individuals as well as for
corporations and today’s global economy with multinational corporations
and computers that can move money all around the world with a single click
on a button has created increased opportunities for tax evasion.          
To prevent tax evasion and tax avoidance governments world-wide have had
to create ways to counter this problem. The United States has been very
active in this area and was the first country to implement legislation on
Controlled Foreign Corporations. The United States has continued on this
path and recently implemented its new disclosure legislation. 
1.1 Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to give an overview of how the United States
tackles the problem of harmful tax competition. The thesis will investigate
and comment on what the United States has done in recent years. This work
will further compare the approach by the United States to the approach by
the OECD.  
 
1.2 Limitation
This thesis will focus on the latest developments in the United States. A few
of the more important pieces of legislation have been chosen as all of the
legislation that affects tax shelters and tax havens have not been possible to
bring up. Out of the legislation chosen, focus has been put on the disclosure
section. The OECD will only be used as a comparison and will not be
thoroughly commented on.
1.3 Method
This thesis is based on accepted legal material. This includes books, articles,
and sections of the Internal Revenue Code. I have further used posted
reports and articles on the OECD, the IRS, and the Treasury Departments
homepages to get the latest developments. I have also made sure that my
material is up to date by visiting the Boalt Hall Law Library in Berkeley,
CA.     
                                                
1 Ault Hugh J, Comparative Income Taxation:A structural analysis, 1997, p. 131.
51.4 Outline
This thesis will start by giving a general overview of international taxation
in the United States where its distinctive traits are explained. The work by
the OECD in the area of tax competition will also be briefly examined. The
thesis continues by explaining some of the more important and recent ways
the United States has chosen to counter harmful tax competition. Special
attention is given to the regulations on disclosure. In chapter six the United
States and the OECD approach is compared and in chapter seven some final
thoughts are given.     
62 The United States
International Taxation in
General
The international taxation in the United States is influenced by its foreign
policy objectives. One of those objectives is achieving tax neutrality.2 A tax
system is tax neutral if it neither discourages nor encourages a particular
activity. This is usually done through capital-export neutrality, capital-
import neutrality or national neutrality. Capital-export neutrality ensures that
a taxpayer´s choice of investing abroad or at home is not affected. Capital-
import neutrality ensures that all firms doing business in a market are taxed
at the same rate. National neutrality ensures that the total U.S. returns on
capital which are shared between the taxpayer and the U.S. Treasury, are the
same whether the capital is invested in the United States or abroad. The U.S.
tax system has elements of all three standards of neutrality.3  
The United States income tax is a global tax based on nationality that taxes
its citizens and residents regardless of source or type of income. This means
that United States citizens and corporations are taxed on their income no
matter where on earth it was earned, although primary taxation authority is
generally given to the country of territorial connection.4
To prevent double taxation, the United States uses a foreign tax credit
system that allows U.S. taxpayers to reduce the U.S. income tax on their
foreign income taxes that they pay on that income. Foreign taxes can only be
credited against U.S. taxes on foreign sourced income and do not reduce
taxes on U.S. sourced income. There is further a foreign tax credit limitation
in the fact that tax credits are calculated separately for different categories of
income in so called “tax credit baskets”. Each basket can only be used
against taxes of the same kind. Taxes not used to deduct U.S. taxes one year
can be used up to five years later.5           
One last distinctive trait worth mentioning about the United States is the
extremely low audit rate. There was in 1995 only a 1.67 percent chance that
a tax return from an individual would be audited.6 Larger corporations were
audited between 20 and 50 percent of the time depending on the size of their
assets. The low audit rate together with the fact that American tax payers
                                                
2 Description and Analysis of Present-Law Rules Relating to International Taxation, Joint
Committee on Taxation, JCX-40-99, june 28 1999. 
3 Abrams Howard E and Doernberg Richard L, Essentials of United States Taxation, 1999,
p. 4-3 – 4-5.
4 Doernberg Richard L, International Taxation in a Nutshell, third edition, 1997, p. 9.
5 Description and Analysis of Present-Law Rules Relating to International Taxation, House
Committee on Ways and Means, june 30 1999, p. 5.a—5.b. 
6 Ault Hugh J, Comparative Income Taxation:A structural analysis, 1997, p. 147.
7tend to be both aggressive and resourceful in their tax planning creates a
dangerous combination. It was estimated that in 1992 individuals only paid
approximately 83 percent of taxes actually owed.7   
                                                
7 Ault Hugh J, Comparative Income Taxation:A  structural analysis, 1997, p. 148.
83 The OECD and Harmful Tax
Competition
The OECD is an international organisation consisting of 30 member states8.
It is meant to be a setting in which governments can discuss, develop, and
perfect economic and social policy.  Its  member states produce two thirds of
the world’s goods and services and the organisation carries a lot of weight in
the international community.9 This is why it is such a good forum for
discussing harmful tax competition. The United States, who is a member,
realizes that it can not stand alone in the fight against harmful tax
competition and takes an active role in the OECD as a complement to its
internal legislative efforts.   
The OECD provides a forum for co-operation and analysis by national tax
authorities to prevent double taxation, to minimise tax avoidance, evasion
and competition and to reduce tax-induced distortions of trade and
investment flows. Its work so far includes the OECD Model Tax
Convention, intra-enterprise Transfer Pricing Guidelines, and co-operation
with non-OECD countries to extend OECD norms and standards outside the
OECD area. 
In 1998 the OECD published a report on harmful tax competition.10 The
1998 report resulted in the creation of a number of guidelines and
recomendations. The report also resulted in the creation of the OECD Forum
on Harmful tax practices. In 2000 The Forum went on to issue a report11 that
sets out the progress made in identifying and curtailing harmful tax practices
both within and outside the OECD.12 The report identifies potentially
harmful tax preferential regimes and jurisdictions meeting the criterias in the
1998 report. The OECD hopes that this report will encourage a process of
dialogue and consultation and possibly a decline of harmful tax competition
in the future.13     
The OECD lists four key factors in identifying tax havens for the purpose of
its 1998 report.14 They are the presence of no or nominal taxes, lack of
                                                
8 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Island, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, Mexico, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and The United States.    
9 http://www.oecd.org/about/general/index.htm 2001-04-03
10 Harmful Tax Competition : An emerging global issue, OECD, 1998.
11 Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices, OECD, june 2000.
12 http://www.oecd.org/media/release/nw00-66a.htm  2001-04-04
13 OECD Supports U.S. Governments Tax Haven Blacklist, Tax Notes International, april
10 2000, p. 1661.
14 Harmful Tax Competition: An emerging global issue, OECD, 1998, p. 23.
9effective exchange of information, lack of transparency and no substantial
activities. The most important factor is the tax rate.15 
The OECD also mentions four key factors in identifying and assessing
harmful preferential tax regimes.16 They are  the presence of no or effective
tax rates, ring fencing of regimes, lack of transparency and lack of effective
exchange of information.
                                                
15 Harmful Tax Competition: An emerging global issue, OECD, 1998, p. 22.
16 Harmful Tax Competition: An emerging global issue, OECD, 1999, p. 27.
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4 The United States Struggle to
Counteract Tax Havens
4.1 Controlled Foreign Corporations
The United States was the first country to implement legislation about so
called Controlled Foreign Corporations (CFCs) and has been the world
leader in the area ever since.17 This means that specific regulations, under
special circumstances, let the IRS tax a shareholder on the income of a
foreign company, even though the shareholder has not yet recieved any
dividends from that company. This kind of legislation is especially needed
in the United States because they tax their citizens on their worldwide
income.18 Without the regulations on CFCs it would be easy for an
American citizen to postpone taxation on his international investments by
accumulating and hiding income in foreign companies located in different
low tax countries.       
The CFC legislation consists of different sets of rules that are ment to
counter different kinds of abusive corporations and tax schemes. They have
been implemented at different times and all work together to form the
network of today. The first CFC legislation called PHC19 was enacted in
1934 and shortly afterward was expanded into the FPHC20. This first set of
tax rules was relatively easy to evade which led to the enactment of Subpart
F21 and the FIC22 in 1962.23 The latest development occured in 1986 with
the enactment of PFIC24. 
An American company with at least sixty percent passive income and owned
by five or fewer American shareholders having at least 50 percent voting or
value power is caught under the PHC rules.25   According to the PHC a
company is taxed on its taxholders undistributed dividends and the
shareholder is taxed on dividends leading to double taxation. The PHC did
not affect investments through foreign companies and the need for further
legislation became obvious. The enactment of the FPHC regulations meant
that American shareholders now could be taxed directly on their investments
in foreign companies.26 The legislation was however only affecting
                                                
17 Wenehed, CFC-Lagstiftning, 2000, p. 239. 
18 Wenehed, CFC-Lagstiftning, 2000, p. 240.
19 Personal Holding Companies. IRC Sec. 541-547.
20 Foreign Personal Holding Companies, IRC Sec. 551-558.
21 Named from its place in the IRC( See Wenehed, 2000, p. 260). IRC Sec. 951-964. 
22 Foreign Investment Income Companies. IRC Sec. 1246.
23 Price Waterhouse, U.S. corporations doing business abroad, 1992, p. 17.
24 Passive Foreign Investment Companies. IRC Sec. 1291-1298.
25 Wenehed, CFC-Lagstiftning, 2000, p. 245-249.
26 Moore and Outslay, U.S. Tax Aspects Of Doing Business Abroad, 2000, p. 332.
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companies controlled directly by individuals. Taxation could be avoided by
using a foreign corporation as an intermediary.27      
Subpart F includes both corporations and individuals. To tax the shareholder
under the subpart F provisions, more than 50 percent of the total combined
voting power of the stock, or more than 50 percent of the stock´s total value
need to be owned by United States shareholders.28 A shareholder in the
sence of the subpart F regulation is any United States person who own at
least 10 percent or more of the total combined voting power of the corporate
stock.29  If these tests are fulfilled the shareholder must include in their
income their pro rata share of the CFCs subpart F income and other income
stated in the IRC Sec. 951(a).30 
The FIC regulations was implemented together with subpart F to try to tax
foreign investment companies. The FIC taxation has however since then
been replaced by the PFIC regulations. A PFIC is a foreign corporation who
meets either a gross income test or an asset test.31 The gross income test is
met if 75 percent or more of the gross income of the foreign corporation is
passive income. Passive income is income that would be foreign personal
holding company income according to the IRC § 954(c).32 The asset test
describes a PFIC as a corporation with at least 50 percent of the
corporation´s assets (by value) held for the production of passive income.33
The PFIC regulations are special in that they do not mention anything about
the size of american ownership.34 The shareholders also find themselves in a
special situation, since they have the option to chose between when to pay
the tax under PFIC. The shareholder can choose to be taxed on a running
basis on the corporations income, to be taxed on unusually large dividend
payments or be taxed when stocks are sold. The choise of postponed taxes
involves payment of interest.        
The fact that a shareholder has been taxed on didvidends not yet distibuted
means that he will not be taxed again when he eventually recieves the
dividends to avoid double taxation except under PHC taxation. The
shareholder also recieves a foreign tax credit for any taxes payed in the
country of residence for the foreign corporation.35 
                                                
27 Wenehed, 2000, p.280.
28 IRC Sec. 957(a).
29 IRC Sec. 951(b).
30 See also Moore and Outslay, U.S. Tax Aspects Of Doing Business Abroad, 2000, p. 279. 
31 IRC Sec. 1297(a).
32 IRC Sec. 1297(a) and § 1297(b)(1). See also Moore and Outslay, 2000, p. 357.
33 IRC Sec. 1297(a)(2). See also Ault and McDaniel, Introduction to United States
International Taxation, 1998, p. 192.
34 Abrams and Doernberg, Essentials of United States Taxation, 1999, p. 195.
35 Ault and McDaniel, Introduction to United States International Taxation, 1998, p. 110
and 117.
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4.2 Treaty Shopping and the Limitation on
Benefits Clause
A tax treaty between two countries is most commonly used to avoid
international double taxation.36 However a treaty can also contain articles
aimed at avoiding treaty shopping or other forms of treaty abuse. One such
article is article 22 concerning limitation on benefits (LOB) in the 1996
United States model income tax convention. This is the United States way to
prevent so called treaty shopping. One way to define treaty shopping is to
see it as ”the use, by residents of third S[t]ates, of legal entities established
in a Contracting State with a principle purpose to obtain the benefits of the
tax treaty between the United States and the other Contracting State”.37
 
Without an LOB article the United States would end up with a  treaty with
the world, including countries it had never entered or intended to enter any
agreements with, as soon as they signed any tax treaty with another country.
To avoid this situation it is nowadays customary to include an LOB clause in
all new tax treaties entered into, and to renegotiate all treaties allready in
force lacking this article.38 
Once an LOB article is in force a resident of a contracting state does not
automaticly qualify for treaty protection. A resident must pass a LOB test
every year and treaty benefits can be excluded both from the other treaty
country as well as from the country of residence. This means that the United
States can deny its own residents benefits such as non-discrimination and
relief from double taxation.39
The LOB test means that a resident must meet one of a number of
alternative conditions.40 Individuals, public entities, companies regularly
traded on recognized stock exchanges, tax exempt organizations and
pension funds are qualified.41 A legal entity not yet qualified under article
22(2) can try to meet an ownership and base erosion test which must both be
satisfied.42 Under the ownership test the legal entity must be owned, directly
or indirectly, by persons who themselves are entitled to treaty benefits under
article 22(2), by at least 50 percent. The base erosion test is intended to
make sure that the tax base is not eroded by requiring that less than 50
percent of the entity´s income is payed to nonresidents as deductible
payments.       
                                                
36 Weeghel, The improper use of tax treaties, 1998, p. 257.
37 Doernberg and Raad, The 1996 United States Model Income Tax Convention:Analysis,
commentary and comparison, 1997, p. 172.
38 Cunningham, Article 23 of the Proposed United States – Ireland Tax Treaty, International
Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, vol. 51 no. 12 1997 , p. 547.  
39 Stitt and Yu, Has the Chase to End Treaty Abuse Gone too Far?, Tax Notes International,
September 4 2000, p. 1058.
40 Article 22, U.S. 1996 Model Income Tax Convention.
41 Article 22(2)(a - e) U.S. 1996 Model Income Tax Convention.
42 Article 22(2)(f) U.S. 1996 Model Income Tax Convention.
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Taxpayers that has not yet satisfied any of the tests may, if passing three
requirements, recieve treaty benfits with respect to certain income connected
to active trade or business.43 The resident must be engaged in an active trade
or business and the income must be connected to that trade or business. The
trade or business must also be substantial in relation to the activity in the
other State generating income. 
If a corporation still do not qualify, there is a last option to apply for treaty
benefits from the competent authority of the state where the benefits are
applied for.44
Just because a corporation or income is qualifyed according to article 22
does not however mean that benefits will be automaticly recieved. Any
requirements in the individual articles entitling benefits must still be
investigated.
The LOB article has recieved some criticism for going too far and create
problems for, or even discriminate against U.S. corporations owned by
third-country residents.45 These companies will never meet the publicly
traded or ownership and base erosion tests and ”whether a resident meets the
”trade or business test” can sometimes be a subjective determination”46.
There is a risk that even legitimate U.S. companies will be left with relief
from the competent authority as their only way out, just because they are
owned by non-residents. 
4.3 Intercompany pricing
The regulation on intercompany- or transfer- pricing is found in IRC Sec.
482 where it has been found, although in different versions, since 1921.47
Today the paragraph authorizes the IRS to allocate gross income, deductions
and credits between related taxpayers to the extent necessary or to clearly
reflect the income of related taxpayers. The paragraph can only be used by
fiscal authorities and its use does not require a purpose of tax avoidance
from the taxpayer.  
To avoid allocation of funds, related corporations need to perform
transactions at an arm´s length basis.48 This means that a transaction
                                                
43 Article 22(3) U.S. 1996 Model Income Tax Convention.
44 Article 22(4) U.S. 1996 Model Income Tax Convention.
45 Stitt and Yu, Has the Chase to End Treaty Abuse Gone too Far?, Tax Notes International,
September 4 2000, p. 1059.
46 Stitt and Yu, Has the Chase to End Treaty Abuse Gone too Far?, Tax Notes International,
September 4 2000, p. 1059.
47 Ault and McDaniel, Introduction To United States International Taxation, 1998, p. 139. 
48 Abrams and Doernberg, Essentials of United States Taxation, 1999, p.139.
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between related corporations49 is compared to how a similar transaction
between unrelated corporations50 would be handled. That is at arms length.   
To compare a controlled transaction to an uncontrolled transaction one
needs to look at different factors and use different methods depending on the
situation. There are a number of methods to chose from, and according to
the best method rule the goal is to select the method that will provide the
most reliable data and measure of comparability.51 The controlled
transaction does not have to be identical to the uncontrolled transaction, but
must be ”significantly similar to the controlled transaction so that the
uncontrolled transaction provides a reliable measure of an arm´s length
result”52.     
Any chosen method may result in a range of results and it is up to the
corporation to choose a result from within that range. However should the
result chosen fall outside the range the IRS may make adjustments based on
any value within the range.53 
The Regulations list five methods to use in the case of transactions
involving tangible property and three methods to use in the case of
transactions involving intangible property. The corporation may also choose
to use an unspecified method. This method may however come under harder
scrutiny and be more likely to be subject to penalties.  
The first method concerning tangible property54 is the comparable
uncontrolled price method, where price and the similarity of the product are
compared with uncontrolled transactions. The next method is the resale
price method. Here you compare the gross profit margin of sales in
uncontrolled transactions and the resale price for the related party. The
difference is the transfer price on the related sale. Under the cost plus
method the cost of goods sold is found in the use of normal accounting
principles followed by an appropiate gross profit markup. The next named
method regarding tangible property is the comparable profits method. This
method looks at the profit level indicators of uncontrolled parties and uses
an equivalent level of profits for controlled parties. The last metod is the
profit split method where one examines the combined profit or loss, and
allocate this to each member of the party, depending on the level of
contribution to the profit or loss.   
                                                
49 Controlled transactions.
50 Uncontrolled transactions.
51 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.482-1(c).
52 Fuller, International Tax Developments, International Bureau Of  Fiscal Documentation,
No. 7/8 1995, p. 302.
53 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1-482(e) and Ault and McDaniel, 1998, p. 142.
54 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1-482-3(a).
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Intangibles55 are much harder to compare resulting in difficulties finding an
arm´s length price.56 The comparable uncontrolled transaction method is
similar to the comparable uncontrolled price method as it try to find the
charge for comparable uncontrolled transactions. The next methods are the
comparable profits method and the profit split method which work the same
way as for the tangible property.
Should the taxpayer report a price that is 200 percent higher or 50 percent
lower than the ”correct price”, according to the best method, he is said to
have made a ”substantial valuation mistreatment”.57 This is also the case if
the total intercompany pricing adjustment exceeds the lesser of $5.000.000
or 10 percent of the taxpayer´s total gross receipts. A substantial valuation
mistreatment means that the IRS will impose a 20 percent penalty on the
taxpayer. If the taxpayer is found to have made a gross valuation
mistreatment instead, he will suffer a 40 percent penalty. This is the case if
the price used is 400 percent higher or 25 percent lower than the ”correct
price” or the total adjustment is the lesser of $20.000.000 or 20 percent of
the taxpayer´s gross receipts.
Any penalties due to a wrongfully reported income or cost may be avoided if
the taxpayer has acted in good faith or had reasonable cause for the
statement.58 Penalties may be ”avoided if the taxpayer ´reasonably` (though
wrongly) used one of the stipulated methods and has contemporaneous
documentation supporting the method chosen and why such method was
reasonable”59.    
The risk of being hit by these severe penalties forces companies to spend a
lot of money on investigating and documenting the best method and making
sure that they follow the intercompany pricing regulations. This is
something that may be especially hard for smaller companies who work
internationally and do not have the resources to perform a thorough and
costly investigation. 
Due to the uncertainty and the risks involved in chosing intercompany
pricing methods it is possible to obtain an Advance Pricing Agreement60.
Here the company may obtain an advance ruling allowing them to use a
specific proposed methodology for a certain period of time without the risk
of penalties.61 This procedure may take up to 12 months and will most likely
be costly.62 
                                                
55 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1-482-4(c).
56 Ault and McDaniel, Introduction to United States International Taxation, 1998, p. 146.
57 IRC Sec. 6662.
58 IRC Sec. 6664.
59 Ault and McDaniel, Introduction to United States International Taxation, 1998, p.154.
60 APA.
61 Abrams and Doernberg, Essentials of United States Taxation, 1999, p. 169-170.
62 Bjarnås Sören, Global taxering enligt en amerikansk modell-en rapport från USA om
utvecklingen inom internprissättningsområdet, SvSkT. 6-7/1994, p. 444.
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Further complications may occur if the tax offices in other countries do not
agree with the IRS and their way of allocating income. If an agreement can
not be reached the company may be hit by double taxation.  
4.4 Blacklisting
One of the more exciting developments in recent years in the fight against
tax havens was the attempt by former President Bill Clinton to establish a
blacklist for tax havens. The Presidents budget proposal for the 2001 fiscal
year, released on February 7, 2000, would have given the U.S. Treasury
department the power to publish a list of identified tax havens.63 The
proposal was not found in the final budget which was later passed by the
Congress of the United States. Despite this it is still interesting to investigate
what the proposal contained and the effects it could have had.     
The Treasury Department would have been given almost free hands to create
the blacklist. The criteria used to determine a country´s status ”would
include, but ”not be limited to,” the following two factors: (1) whether the
jurisdiction imposes no or nominal taxes, either generally or on a specific
class of capital income, and (2) whether the country has strict confidentiality
rules and/or ineffective information exchange practices.”64.
A country that ended up being blacklisted could waive its confidentiality
rules on tax information or enter into an agreement to exchange tax
information, and thereby be taken off the blacklist. This is a conveniant
move that would ensure that manufacturing tax havens like Ireland would
never show up on any blacklist.65   
All monetary transactions as well as transfers of tangible and intangible
property from the United States to a blacklisted country would have to be
reported on the different taxpayers tax returns. A failure to comply with this
obligation would result in a 20 percent penalty. Payments under the amount
of  US $10.000 would not fall under the reporting requirements. For larger
amounts the taxpayer could assure that payment information would be
available to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service upon request to be excused
from reporting.66  
                                                
63 Goulder, U.S. Budget Would Blacklist Tax Havens, Tax Notes International, Feb. 14
2000, p. 699.
64 Goulder, U.S. Budget Would Blacklist Tax Havens, Tax Notes International, February 14
2000, p. 699.
65 Sheppard, U.S. Budget Business Provisions:A blacklist for havens, Tax Notes
International, February 21 2000, p. 815. 
66 Goulder, U.S. Budget Would Blacklist Tax Havens, Tax Notes International, February 14
2000, p 699.
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The U.S. would further deny any foreign tax credits that could have been the
result from taxes paied in a tax haven. A separate foreign tax credit basket67
would be created that would separate taxes paied in tax havens from taxes
paied in other countries not named on the blacklist.68 The result would be
double taxation and comparing tax havens with countries associated with
international terrorism, since the U.S. already denies tax credits for taxes
paid to countries like Libya and Iraq.69    
The OECD has made possitive comments on the blacklist proposal from the
United States. The OECD finds that the proposal is in line with current
OECD work in the area, and that ”The criteria the Treasury would use to
determine what countries are tax havens mirror those factors the OECD has
developed and widely publiziced.”70. 
4.5 Disclosure
4.5.1 Overview
The recent regulations on disclosure are the United States latest effort to
stop the rapid growth of abusive corporate tax shelters, which Treasury
Secretary Lawrence H. Summers sees as ”the most serious compliance issue
threatening the American tax system today”71. The global economy and
rapid technological advances like the internet has made it relatively easy for
corporations and individuals to move money undetected around the world.
For example it is estimated that more than 80 percent of the internet sites
promoting so-called asset protection are advocating tax fraud.72
Governments today need to find a way to find out about these international
fraudulent schemes and transactions to protect their tax revenues. There are
calculations that shows that cracking down on tax shelters could raise as
much as $22.9 billion over 10 years in the United States alone.73
                                                
67 See ”The United States International Taxation In General” for information on tax credit
baskets. 
68 Sheppard, U.S. Budget Business Provisions:A blacklist for havens, Tax Notes
International, February 21 2000, p. 815.
69 Goulder, U.S. Budget Would Blacklist Tax Havens, Tax Notes International, February 14
2000, p. 700.
70 Goulder, OECD Supports U.S. Government´s Tax Haven Blacklist, Tax Notes
International, April 10 2000, p. 1660.
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It is hard to create an exact definition of a corporate tax shelter. There are
however a few characteristics that are often found upon closer
examination.74 A lack of any significant economic substance or risk to the
participating parties, or the fact that the financial accounting treatment of a
shelter item has been inconsistent with the claimed Federal income taxes,
may point towards a corporate tax shelter. So does the use of tax indifferent
parties, high transaction costs, contingent or refundable fees, confidentiality
and the possibility to sell the same shelter product to several customers.
The previous efforts by the IRS, the Treasury and Congress to stop corporate
tax shelters were not enough. Most attacks on the corporate tax shelters
targeted specific transactions on an ad hoc basis using legislation,
administrative guidance and litigation. Although a significant number of
visible shelter and transaction schemes were closed down as they were
discovered, new ones were created to replaced the old ones, and a significant
number were never even discovered at all.75 This approach also had
disadvantages as it was time consuming, costly, complicating the tax law
and creating uncoherent legal cases. After a while taxpayers were able to
pick between the different court cases to find rulings to justify their
actions.76     
The current approach consists of a set of regulations that are ment to work
together and simultaneously attack the corporate tax shelters from different
directions. Promoters are forced to register confidential corporate tax
shelters and to maintain lists of investors. Corporate taxpayers are required
to disclose large transactions that have characteristics common to corporate
tax shelters and penalties for non compliance with the regulations will be
increased. The IRS has also created an Office of Tax Shelter Analysis that
will focus on this problem area and review information gathered through the
new regulations. 
4.5.2 Corporate Tax Shelter Registration
The IRC section 6111 requires the registration of confidential corporate tax
shelters by their promoters. The registration is supposed to be done before
the first offering of sale in such shelters occurs. Any offer to participate is
treated as an offer of sale. This will give the IRS information on all new
shelters as soon as they pop up which allows the IRS a chance to scrutinize
and crack down on abusive shelters right away.
 
                                                
74 The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters:Discussion, Analysis and Legislative Proposals,
Department of the Treasury, july 1999, p. v-vi.
75 Tackling The Growth of Corporate Tax Shelters:Treasury Secretary Lawrence H.
Summers remarks to the federal bar association, Washington DC, Treasury News from the
Office of Public Affairs, february 28 2000, p. 2. 
76 Penalty and Interest Provisions, Corporate Tax Shleters: Acting Assistant Secretary
Jonathan Talisman before the Senate Committee on Finance, March 8 2000. 
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A promoter includes tax shelter organizers and any other person who
participates in the organization, management or sale of a tax shelter, or any
person related to such tax shelter organizer or such other person. Should
there be no domestic promoters and no foreign promoters have registered
the shelter, any domestic person who even discusses participation in the
shelter must perform the registration.77
To qualify as a confidential corporate tax shelter that demands registration
under section 6111 there are three requirements that all needs to be satisfied.
First of all a significant purpose of the structure of the transaction needs to
be the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax. Further the transaction
should be offered to any potential participants under conditions of
confidentiality. The last requirement is that the promoter could receive fees
in the excess of $100.000.    
The avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax is considered a significant
purpose of the structure of a transaction if the transaction is the same as, or
substantially similar, to one of the specified types of transactions that the
IRS has determined to be a tax avoidance transaction. So is the case if the
present value of the participant´s reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the
transaction is insignificant relative to the present value of the participant´s
expected net Federal income tax savings from the transation.78 The last
situation when tax evasion is the significant purpose is when the transaction
has been structured to produce Federal income tax benefits that constitute an
important part of the intended results of the transaction, and the tax shelter
promoter reasonably expects the transaction to be presented to more than
one potential participant.79 
Reporting is however not required if the participant enters into the
transaction as part of the ordinary course of business and it is clear that the
transaction and tax reduction is allowed in the IRC for this reason.
Avoidance of Federal income tax also does not require reporting if the
promoter determines that it is beyond all doubt that the benefits from the
transaction would not be allowed. In the case of doubt a promoter has two
options. He may request a ruling from the IRS as to wether the transaction
needs to be registered or not, or he can register the shelter and add that it is
being filed on a protective basis.80   
     
When determining whether an offer of sale is made under confidentiality all
facts and circumstances are looked upon. Confidentiality may exist even
without legally binding oral or written agreements. Implied understandings
                                                
77 Coporate Tax Shelter Registration, Federal Register, vol. 65 no. 42, march 2 2000,
temporary regulations, T.D. 8876, p. 11217.
78 Also called the significant purpose test.
79 Coporate Tax Shelter Registration, Federal Register, vol. 65 no. 42, march 2 2000,
temporary regulations, T.D. 8876, p. 11215-11216.
80 Coporate Tax Shelter Registration, Federal Register, vol. 65 no. 42, march 2 2000,
temporary regulations, T.D. 8876, p. 11216.
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or the fact that the promoter is aware that the transaction is protected from
disclosure in any other way is enough. A written agreement between the
participant and the promoter, that waives all confidentiality and shows that
the transaction is not made under conditions of confidentiality may
sometimes be the only way out.81    
All facts and circumstances are also looked upon when determining whether
a promoter receives fees in excess of $100.000, which is assumed unless the
promoter proves otherwise. All fees or part of fees with any connection to
the confidential corporate tax shelter are considered.82  
Registration of a confidential corporate tax shelter involves providing a
detailed description of the tax shelter, including the structure of the tax
shelter and the tax benefits.83
4.5.3 Maintaining Lists
The IRC section 6112 requires any person who organizes or sells any
interest in a potentially abusive tax shelter to maintain a list identifying each
investor who has bought an interest in that potentially abusive shelter.
A potentially abusive tax shelter under the IRC section 6112 is a transaction
for which a significant purpose of the structure of the transaction is the
avoidance or evasion of income tax. This includes any shelter that is
registered under the IRC section 6111 and any other entity, plan or
arrangement, if specified in regulations, that has a potential for tax
avoidance or evasion. 
There is no requirement that a promoter must make §100.000 in fees or that
the transaction should be subject to confidentiality as under the confidential
corporate tax shelter regulations. This means that a transaction may be
subject to the listed requirement but not the registration requirement.   
As under the IRC section 6111 a procedure excists for obtaining an advance
ruling as to wether a list needs to be maintained.
The list is supposed to be made available upon request from the Secretary of
the Treasury and the information must be saved at least seven years. The
information required on the list includes a detailed description of the tax
shelter that describes both the structure of the tax shelter and the intended
tax benefits for participants in the tax shelter, the amount of money invested
or to be invested by each person, a summary of likely tax benefits for each
                                                
81 Coporate Tax Shelter Registration, Federal Register, vol. 65 no. 42, march 2 2000,
temporary regulations, T.D. 8876, p. 11216.
82 Id.
83 Id.
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investor and copies of any additional written material. Each list must also
identify every other tax shelter that the organizer offers that presents a
somewhat similar structure or tax benefit.84
4.5.4 Requiring Corporate Taxpayers to Report
Participation in Tax Shelters
The IRC section 6011 requires any corporate taxpayer that has participated
in a reportable transaction, to file a disclosure statement together with their
Federal income tax return if the their income tax is affected by this
transaction. The first time a disclosure statement is filed a copy must also be
sent to the IRS Office of Tax Shelter Analysis in Washington. Reportable
transactions are ”listed transactions” and ”other reportable transactions”.
Listed transactions are transactions identified in IRS Notice 2000-15 and
transactions that are similar to the ones on the list. The transaction must
however reduce the taxpayers Federal income tax by more than $1 million in
any single year or by a total of more than $2 million for any combination of
tax years to be treated as a reportable transaction.85   
Other reportable transactions are transactions that will reduce the Federal
income tax by more than $5 million in any single year, or by a total of $10
million for any combination of years, and has at least two out of six listed
characteristics.86 
These characteristics are:
1. The taxpayer has participated in the transactions under conditions of
confidentiality.
2. The taxpayer has obtained or been provided with certain contractual
protections.
3. The promoter has received at least $100.000 in fees.
4. There is a difference of at least $5 million between book income and
income tax treatment.
5. The characterisation of transaction for Federal income tax purposes
differs from the expected characterisation for tax purposes in another
country  
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A transaction that has at least two of the previous characteristics is however
not a reportable transaction if it also has one out of four other distinctive
traits.87 This does not affect listed transactions in IRS Notice 2000-15.
Non-reportable transactions:
1. The taxpayer has participated in the transaction in the ordinary course of
business and would have participated even without tax benefits.
2. The taxpayer has participated in the transaction in the ordinary course of
business, and there is a understanding that tax benefits from the
transaction are allowable under the IRC for the same reasons. 
3. There is no reasonable basis for denial of the tax benefit.
4. The transaction is identified in published guidance as being excepted
from discloure.
The taxpayer must keep all records related to the transaction until the
expiration of the statute of limitations. This includes marketing materials,
written analyses, correspondence and so on.88
4.5.5 Penalties
A corporation or a promoter can be subject to penalties for not following the
disclosure provisions.  
If a promoter fails to register a confidential corporate tax shelter he could be
penalised by an amount equal to the greater of 50 percent of the fees paid to
all promoters of the tax shelter or $10.000. If the failure to register is
deemed intentional the penalty will instead be 75 percent of the fees.89
If a promoter fails to maintain a list of investors in potentially abusive tax
shelters he shall pay a penalty of $50 for each person that is not put on the
list, unless the promoter can show that he had reasonable cause for his
actions and that the failure was not due to willful neglect. The penalty shall
not exceed $100.000 for any single calendar year.90 
If a corporation can show that it has acted in good faith under the IRC Sec.
6664, penalties may be reduced or waived even though it has not acted
according to the specified regulations. But if a corporate taxpayer fails to
disclose its participation in a corporate tax shelter, and there is an
underpayment of taxes, it may reduce or eliminate the corporations chances
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to show that it has acted in good faith, and it will most likely have to pay the
penalties.91 
4.5.6 Office of Tax Shelter Analysis
The new Office of Tax Shelter Analysis is expected to serve as a clearing
house for all information relating to tax shelter activity. The activities of the
office will include reviewing all disclosures under the new disclosure
regulation, identifying participating taxpayers and assessing the overall
extent of tax shelter activity by corporate taxpayers. The Office of Tax
Shelter Analysis will also work to identify potentially improper tax shelter
transactions at the earliest possible time.92 
The IRS experts on tax shelters and their knowledge will be gathered at one
place and it will be easier to keep a limited group of employees up to date
with education etc. This group of people will work as a resource to use by
other IRS offices around the country.
4.5.7 Comments
It was obvious that something had to be done to fix the problem with
corporate tax shelters. The old ad hoc system was not a sustainable solution.
The question is however if the new system has gone too far by putting too
much pressure on legitimate companies and tax shelter promoters, and
requiring disclosure in too many situations.
The new tax shelter disclosure regulations attack the problem by requiring
people participating in corporate tax shelter transactions to create, maintain
and provide the IRS with information about the transactions and people
associated with the transactions. The new regulations has recieved a lot of
criticism from various representatives of business organisations and law and
accounting firms. There is a widespread concern that the regulations will hit
a number of transactions that the legislator did not intend to hit.93 This will
create a lot of extra work for both businesses who need to supply
information, and for the IRS who needs to review the information. Here will
follow a few of the areas that have received the most criticism.   
As mentioned earlier94 corporate taxpayers must disclose their participation
in reportable transactions. The ”two out of six” test to define ”other
                                                
91 Corporate Tax Shelter regulations:disclosure of reportable transactions, Tax Executive,
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reportable transactions” may however involve a lot of ordinary business
transactions in the reporting requirement. Large corporations will for
instance often have a book/tax difference greater than $5 million as defined
in characteristic number four and the test will be a one in five test instead.
The fifth test may further result in automatically making every transaction
that involves a foreign party a reportable transaction since it is most likely
that the foreign persons tax position will differ from that of an American. 95       
The list of non reportable characteristics is intended to remedy the excessive
involvment of transactions under the ”two out of six” test. The first
characteristic is for instance intended  to relieve transactions entered into
during the ordinary course of business if the taxpayer would have
participated even without the tax benefits. However, in too many
transactions today, tax benefits are an important factor. The second and third
characteristics are also problematic as to the uncertainty of the meaning of
”understanding” and ”reasonable basis”.96 
There has also been critisism aginst the tax shelter registration and the list
maintenance regulations. The significant purpose test97 has been attacked for
being too narrow. The regulation treats a transaction as lacking economic
substance if the reasonably expected pre-tax profits of the transaction are
insignificant relative to the reasonable expected tax benefits. It is by many
seen as wrong to focus on pre-tax profit as it should not be the only factor to
be considered. It is also unclear as to how much profit could be
insignificant, and no consideration is given to routine transactions that are
not intended to produce a profit.98 
The list maintenance regulation is among other things criticized for not
containing minimum thresholds on tax savings or fees. The current system
will involve a lot of ordinary tax planning that is of no real interest to the
IRS.99   
As we have recently seen the legslation is unclear and creates a great deal of
uncertainty for taxpayers. This will most likely lead to excessive disclosure
from taxpayers who just wants to be on the safe side. The IRS may find
itself getting burried in information it neither needs nor wants. Valuable
resourses will have to be used just sorting out the useful information from
routine transactions.      
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5 Comparing The United States
and the OECD Approach
One clear distinction between the OECD and The United States approach to
fight harmful tax competition is the focus by the OECD on the state where
the investment is made and the focus by the U.S. on the taxpayer.
The OECD works by putting pressure on any states that exercise harmful tax
competition. The OECD can not force any country to change their internal
legislation but can put considerable political pressure on a single country.
Cooperation and the creation of dialogue are important goals for the OECD
as they try to convince countries to change their tax systems.      
The OECD´s biggest strength is its member states. The organisation has a
lot of the industrialized countries as members and they carry a lot of
economic power. Their strenght is however also a weakness as it can be
difficult for 30 member states to agree on an issue. It can be a slow process
but will be easier after agreeing on the guidelines in the 1998 report.     
The United States on the other hand can implement regulations with U.S
interests in the forefront without taking too much consideration to other
countries. This means that the United States can focus on how to best get
their taxpayers to pay their taxes. This has been done by focusing on the
taxpayer himself and specific transactions. The United States does not by
itself try to convince other countries to change their taxation levels through
internal legislation.  
There was a try by the U.S. to create a blacklist of tax havens. This blacklist
was however never created. The need for this blacklist seems to be only
complementary to the other U.S. regulations on tax havens. If a country is in
danger of ending up on the blacklist, transactions to that country would most
likely be caught under other disclosure requirements anyway. It can also be
more politicaly conveniant to attack a specific transaction than an
independent country.    
There are a number of advantages of going after your own taxpayers instead
of other countries. It is much easier to enforce regulations agains your own
taxpayers. You can use various coersion methods not otherwise available as
they are within U.S. jurisdiction.  
Looking at the actual regulations that characterize transactions that need to
be disclosed and comparing them to the OECD factors that point towards a
tax haven, one sees some similarities. The OECD finds that the most
important factor to look at is the level of taxation. The U.S. regulations do
not explicitly mention the taxation levels required to get out of reporting
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requirements. Tax benefits from a transaction, which are important, are
however most commonly received due to a lower taxation in the other
country.     
Both the United States and the OECD have in common that they do not
focus on only one factor, they use several factors and look at the whole
picture. Another circumstance that the OECD uses is the lack of effective
exchange of information by tax haven jurisdictions. The United states
investigates if a transaction is entered into under confidentiality. This
involves confidentiality from the promoter and the transaction as a whole is
investigated.     
The OECD also investigates the absence of a requirement that the taxpayer
activity is substantial as this may suggest that a jurisdiction may be
attempting to attract investment and transactions that are purely tax
driven.100 The United States uses a significant purpose test and investigates
if a significant purpose of the transaction is the avoidance of evasion of
taxes. This test together with the exception of ordinary business transactions
from reporting means that paper constructions are not sufficent since
companies need to perform actual business activities in the country. 
What kind of business activities a company performs are also an important
factor in taxing a taxpayer under the CFC regulations and disqualifying
taxpayers from tax treaty protection according to the limitation on benefits
clause. 
The different approaches to the same issue is due to the fact that the actual
counteracting measures need to be taken at the national, rather than at the
multilateral level. The OECD would go too far if it started taking far
reaching meassures against harmful tax competition on a multilateral level
and the United States would not have sole power to pressure other states.
Since the Unites States is a member in the OECD it will also continue its
work in that forum and put tax havens under pressure from another
direction.   
                                                
100 Harmful Tax Competition:An emerging global issue, OECD, 1998, p. 24. 
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6 Final Comments
Since the United States taxes it´s citizens and corporations on their
worlwide income, it is vital for the IRS to find out about about U.S.
taxpayers foreign investments. What you do not know about you can not tax.
This is why the new disclosure regulations are so important to the IRS. 
The disclosure may also have secondary effects like helping with the
compliance problem and reducing the disrespect for the tax code. If
taxpayers have to report their beneficial foreign investments to the IRS they
may be less likely to get involved in such transactions at all. The risk of
getting audited may also increase for entering into such transactions which
will further deter involvment.  
The fact that promoters of tax shelters are also targeted and may suffer
penalties may reduce the inventiveness by these promoters. It is however
hard to tell about the future since taxpayers are very industrious. There will
always be a demand for lowering taxes and people will always find ways to
avoid regulations. The only questions is when that will happen. 
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